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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
As appropriately restated, this appeal presents the following issue:
Whether the district court correctly determined that Summit County
considered Ordinance 436 necessary for the use and development of land within the
County so as to be authorized by the County Land Use Development and Management
Act ("CLUDMA"), and subject to CLUDMA's time limitations and standards of review.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness. Cache County v. Property Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 922 P.2d
758, 766 (Utah 1996). However, Summit County's legislative acts and the legislative
findings supporting them are presumed correct, "it is 'the court's duty to resolve all doubts
in favor3 of the municipality and the burden is on the plaintiff challenging a municipal
land use decision to show that the municipal action was clearly beyond the [County's]
power." Bradley v. Payson City Corp.. 2003 UT 16, 11 12; 70 P.3d 47 quoting Gayland
v. Salt Lake County 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
1.

County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code

Annotated §§ 17-27-101 (Short tide), 17-27-102 (Purpose), 17-27-301 (General plan),
17-27-401 (General powers), 17-27-1001(2)(a)(Appeals).
2.

Rule 65B(a) and (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (governing actions for

extraordinary relief).

3.

Summit County Ordinance No. 436.l
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
In an attempt to accommodate accelerated development that was threatening the

available supply of safe culinary water and the capacity of certain smaller water companies
within the Snyderville Basin to meet their contractual commitments to supply water,
beginning in 2000 Summit County undertook a coordinated program: (i) to establish a
public culinary water distribution system through the use of a water special service district
to take the place of a collection of small, inadequately financed private companies (R. at
8); and (ii) to implement through its zoning powers a mechanism for rating the capacity
of both public and private culinary water companies in the County to assure that those
accepting new residential customers had the ability to deliver the actual "wet" water which
they had committed to provide. (R. at 8-9.)
Pursuant to these efforts, on November 14, 2002, the Summit County Commission
adopted Ordinance 436. (Compl. Ex. 1, R. at 27-52.) In support of the Ordinance, the
commission made certain legislative findings as follows:
. . . the 2000 water year was very dry and the drought has continued into
the 2002 water year resulting in several water systems within the Snyderville Basin
experiencing water source deficiencies and/or a loss of water quality thereby
affecting the ability of the water systems to provide adequate water service to
existing connections or to permit new connections to be made to the water
systems; and,

1

The statutes referenced here are set forth in their entirety in the Addendum, with
the exception of Summit County Ordinance No. 436, which is attached to the Appellants3
Brief as Attachment No. 2.

. . . other shortages of water experienced during the summer of 2000, were
caused by poor water system management decisions and by well failures and other
causes reasonably beyond the control of water system management; and,

. . . the random shortages experienced could have been lessened, to some
extent, if the Basin's water distribution systems had been interconnected and a
management vehicle had been in place to facilitate the sharing of available surplus
water resources among the various suppliers of drinking water; and,
. . . the County adopted an emergency Ordinance No. 385, on May 15,
2000, known as the Concurrency Ordinance, which imposed temporary zoning
regulations on the western side of Summit County that tied development approvals
and the issuance of building permits to the availability of water, and the County
adopted Ordinance No. 400, perpetuating the concurrency requirement of the
temporary zoning ordinance; and,
, . . Ordinance 400 in its application required the issuance of Water
Concurrency Letters as a condition to obtaining a building permit, and the Water
Concurrency Letter had a duration of up to one year, and did not require the
Water Suppliers to make a permanent commitment and allocation of water to lot
purchasers, thereby creating uncertainty as to whether a lot purchaser had the right
to connect and receive water service, or whether there would be water available for
the water company to provide service, which had the effect of placing the
regulatory burden of Water Suppliers not meeting the demands of their service area
on lot owners rather than on the Water Suppliers; and,
. . . neither the Division of Drinking Water nor the County have in the past
had the staff resources and funding available to provide more than an initial
feasibility review of a Water Supplier's water system and appurtenances and no
continuing periodic monitoring has been performed to ensure Water Suppliers3
continued ability to meet the service demands of its system; and,
. . . the County strongly believes that new growth should not occur unless
the Water Supplier who will serve the new growth can demonstrate that it can and
will have the ability to develop the physical resources to provide the anticipated
service; and

. . . the County believes that building permits should not be issued for new
construction unless the physical water supply then currently exists to serve the new
connection, and that once a commitment for service is given by a Water Supplier
that it should be irrevocable to protect the property owner's ability to obtain water
service and to preserve the marketability of the property; and

. . . the Board of County Commissioners is authorized pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 17-27-101, et seq., as amended, to adopt an ordinance
establishing these zoning regulations; and
. . . the Board of County Commissioners finds that there is a compelling,
countervailing public interest to properly regulate development in areas that are, or
may be, adversely impacted by water source capacity.
(R. at 27-29.)
Based on these findings, Ordinance 436 requires, inter alia, that: (i) before a
developer receives plat approval or building permits from the County, the developer have a
letter issued by a water company within the County indicating the water company's
willingness and commitment to supply water (R. at 38-40); (ii) water companies
supplying development within the County submit an annual Supply/Demand Study and
five-year forecast (R. at 42-48); and (iii) through an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement
with the Utah Department of Environmental Quality there is appointed a District
Engineer who evaluates the Supply/Demand Studies submitted by the water companies,
and certifies the studies to the Summit County Health Director, who must, in turn,
approve or reject each Water Demand Study in writing after certification by the District
Engineer. (R. at 33-34, 42-48.)
Ordinance 436 further provides an administrative appeal process to persons
aggrieved by any decision rendered under the Ordinance:

Peer Review. If the Director rejects a Supply/Demand Study based upon the
recommendations of the District Engineer, or if the Water Supplier or any
Customer on the Water Supplier's distribution system disputes any conclusions of
the District Engineer in his or her certification to the County, the concerned party
may request Peer Review of the District Engineer's findings and conclusions.

iii.
The decision of the Peer Reviewer will be issued within 15 working
days of the submittal of the contested Supply/Demand Study and the
District Engineer's conclusions to the Peer Reviewer.
iv.
The Director of Health shall then act upon the recommendations of
the Peer Reviewer and either approve or reject the annual Supply/Demand
Study based upon that recommendation.
Appeal of a Decision of the Summit County Director of Health. The decision of
the Director shall be deemed the final action of Summit County. Any party
aggrieved by a decision of the Director under this Ordinance may seek judicial
review in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
(R. at 47.) CLUDMA, referenced in the findings of Ordinance 436, provides, in turn,
that:
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the
local decision is rendered.
(3)(a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid;
and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.

(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001.
By way of a Petition for Review pursuant to § 17-27-1001, Plaintiffs and
Appellants Summit Water Distribution Company, a private, purportedly non-profit water
company that sells culinary water within Summit County, and its owners (collectively
"Summit Water35), have previously sued the County and challenged the application of the
precursor water concurrency ordinances, Ordinances 385, 400 and 415. (Rl at 28-29.)2
However, in the Complaint subject to this appeal, Summit Water did not name Summit
County, and did not pose any challenge to Ordinance 436 nor make any allegations
concerning its validity under CLUDMA. (R. at 1-26.)
Rather, in this action, Summit Water sued Mountain Regional Water Special
Service District, the water special service district established by the County, and its officers
and directors, including the Board of County Commissioners as its governing board
(collectively "MRSSD"). (R. at 1.) Summit Water also sued the District Engineer and
County Health Director (collectively the "Administrative Defendants35).3 (R. at 1.)
Essentially, Summit Water alleged: (i) that the MRSSD Water Demand Study submitted
on January 31, 2003, was based on false and fraudulent data, and contained false and
fraudulent statements and information (R. at 12 -18); (ii) that the Administrative

2

Summit Water's challenge to Summit County's actions on antitrust grounds was
also dismissed by the district court, and is subject to another appeal pending in this Court,
Summit Water Distribution Co., et al. v. Summit County et aL Case No. 20040033-CA.
3

MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants were and are represented by different
counsel. However, in light of the disposition of the case in the district court, they join in
this single Appellees5 Brief to jointly address all issues Summit Water raised on appeal.

Defendants approved and certified most, but not all, of the study on March 3 and 4, 2003,
thereby rating MRSSD for a greater capacity than it otherwise should have had (R. at 22);
and (iii) that Summit Water was aggrieved by these circumstances because MRSSD's
rating affected Summit Water's "competitive position" in the Summit County water
market. (R. at 24-27.)
As the vehicle for its Complaint, Summit Water relied upon "Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65B(a) & (d) or otherwise," and for its "Cause[s] of Action," asserted that:
(i) the Court should "mandatorily order [MRSSD] to file a true, accurate, complete and
non-fraudulent water Supply/Demand Study" (First "Cause of Action," R. at 24); (ii) the
Court should "mandatorily order the [the Administrative Defendants] to perform their
obligations under Ordinance No. 436" by "rejecting] Mountain Regional^ Water
Concurrency Submission as being inaccurate," by "requiring] that Mountain Regional file
a true and accurate water concurrency Supply/Demand Study," and by first recommending
and then ordering "an audit of Mountain Regional as provided for in Ordinance No. 436"
(Second "Cause of Action," R. at 25); and (3) the Court should "mandatorily order the
[County Commissioner] Richer to produce the Report and analysis of William Brown"
(Third "Cause of Action," R. at 26.)
MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants moved to dismiss Summit Water's
Complaint on the grounds that Rule 65B provided no basis for the relief sought. (R. at
97-100.) Defendants argued that mandamus was not appropriate because Summit Water
had other plain, speedy and adequate remedies specified by the Ordinance and § 17-271001; and pursuant to these remedies Summit Water's Complaint was untimely, having
been filed June 26, 2003, some 114 days after MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants
had taken the challenged actions. (R. at 097-0125).

In response, Summit Water made essentially two arguments: First, Summit Water
made the argument it now advances on appeal (albeit in a different form) and contended
that Ordinance 436 "involves the regulation and supervision of water companies within
the county and does not 'regulate land use,3" so CLUDMA had no application to its
Complaint. (R. at 164-67.) Second, Summit Water contended that its Complaint actually
alleged "violations" of Ordinance 436, rather than challenging decisions rendered pursuant
to the ordinance, and was thus proper under CLUDMA's provisions allowing actions for
injunctive relief to redress violations of the Act. (R. at 165-77.)
The district court heard oral arguments on the motions, and issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order granting the motions to dismiss. (R. at 232.) As for Summit Water's
first argument, the court started with an analysis of Ordinance 436, and found that it
"speaks in terms of water availability and growth and demand, and the need to protect the
public and watch over development as it relates to water usage." (R. at 235.) Thus the
court concluded: "The Court believes this was a land use decision . . . [and] fits within
the ambit of CLUDMA." (R. at 236.) The court went on to reject Summit Water's
arguments that it was seeking injunctive relief to redress "violations" of the Ordinance,
instead of decisions made pursuant to it, stating in pertinent part:
Here, the county officials did "decide" something. That is, they decided to
accept the submission of MRSSD and they acted on that submission. If that
decision was based on information that was not true, it was still a decision. . . .
The court cannot escape that conclusion. Plaintiff asserts that the engineer did not
decide anything, but violated his duty by not fully investigating the submission.
Even if true, the allegation leads the court to the conclusion that the engineer still
"decided" to pass the submission on to the health director. If that decision was
"wrong" was it a decision that was not in the "exercise of the provisions" of
CLUDMA? The court is not finding Toone or Culbertson helpful in answering
this question. The court . . . believes on balance either a statutory scheme exists to
deal with such matters, or every action by a county is subject to such requests as

plaintiff makes in this case if there is an allegation that the material submitted was
false or misleading. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be used
when there is another remedy
. . . The effect of plaintiffs demand, if granted, would be for this court to
tell the Summit County Engineer to require MRSSD to resubmit a concurrency
report, evaluate it again, and pass it on to the health director again. If an opponent
to that submission requested, the court could be asked to demand the process be
repeated again, seemingly without end.
(R. at 237-38.)
Summit Water now appeals the district court's decision. On appeal, iStunmit Water
has abandoned arguments that its Complaint sought to redress "violations" of
Ordinance 436, so as not to be time barred under other provisions of CLUDMA (as well
as its argument that Defendants should be mandatorily enjoined to provide Summit Water
with certain documents), thereby implicitly conceding that if Ordinance 436 is authorized
by CLUDMA, the district court's order of dismissal was correct. Rather, Summit Water
now asserts only that "Ordinance No. 436 is not a land use ordinance and could not have
been promulgated pursuant to any authority granted to Summit County by the State of
Utah under CLUDMA." Appellants3 Br. at p. 9. See dso id. at pp. 11-19. For this
reason, Summit Water argues, the district court erred in applying CLUDMA's time and
standard of review limitations to Summit Water's Complaint. Id.
B.

Reply to Appellants3 Statement of Facts.
Consistent with standards applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the

district court, MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants assumed for the limited
purposes of the court's rulings only that the facts alleged in Summit Water's Amended

Complaint were true.4 (R. at 236.) Summit Water now emphasizes those facts in its
brief, to the exclusion of others. Appellants3 Br. at pp. 4-9. However, the facts material
to the district court's decision to dismiss Summit Water's Complaint are those facts
evidencing the legislative findings, purpose and effect of Ordinance 436, and those
demonstrating the timing and effect of the decisions attacked by Summit Water's
Complaint. Those facts are all summarized in Appellees' description of the,nature of the
case and course of proceedings as set forth above.5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summit Water's sole argument on appeal, that CLUDMA does not provide
authorization for Ordinance 436 and thus CLUDMA's time and standard of review
limitations do not apply, does not begin or end with an analysis of CLUDMA's enabling
language. That language provides, in pertinent part, that: "to provide for the health,
safety, and welfare . . . counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they
consider necessary for the use and development of land within the county. . . . " Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-102.
Pursuant to this enabling language, the relevant inquiry Summit Water does not
even address is whether, in order to provide for the common welfare, the County

4

Appellees in fact vigorously contest the "opprobrious epithets of malice" and
allegations of even criminal conduct which literally permeate Summit Water's pleadings
and papers on appeal.
5

Appellees point out that a description of the legislative findings supporting the
Ordinance is included in the Ordinance itself, which is, in turn, attached as an exhibit to
Summit Water's Complaint and incorporated by reference. (R. at 9, 27-52.) These facts
are thus properly considered on review of the district court's order of dismissal pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), and on this appeal, which presents legal issues of statutory and ordinance
interpretation.

considered Ordinance 436 necessary for land use and development. Without any dispute
or even allegation to the contrary the legislative record before the Court establishes that
the County did consider the regulations imposed by the Ordinance, including those
regulations impacting water companies operating in the County to be necessary to, and
intimately connected with, land use and development.
This is so despite the fact that the Ordinance does require the Administrative
Defendants to evaluate all water companies5 water rights, storage capacities, system
demands, and other water-related functions in order to assess the companies' actual ability
to deliver water to developments, and despite the fact that the state might also impose
comprehensive but not co-extensive regulations. In short, when CLUDMA's plain and
unambiguous enabling language is applied to the legislative findings of the Board of
County Commissioners and the express terms of the Ordinance itself, there is no question
Ordinance 436 was enacted under authority granted by CLUDMA. Summit Water's
arguments to the contrary here border on frivolity.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMIT WATER'S ARGUMENT THAT ORDINANCE 436 WAS
NOT ENACTED UNDER AUTHORITY GRANTED BY CLUDMA
IS WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW.
Summit Water's sole assertion on appeal is that because Ordinance 436 purports to
regulate water companies, it was not promulgated under any authority given Summit
County by CLUDMA, and so the district court erred in applying CLUDMA's time and
standard of review limitations to Summit Water's Complaint. Appellants3 Br. at pp. 11-

19. But Summit Water's arguments purporting to support this proposition do not bear
analysis.
Summit Water first contends that CLUDMA does not provide authority for
Ordinance 436 because "[i]n essence, the Ordinance is water, not land use, regulation.53
*Id. at 13. In doing so, Summit Water lists certain water-related elements which the
Ordinance requires the Administrative Defendants to evaluate in order to verify whether a
water company actually has the current and future ability to deliver wet water to
development within the County. Appellants5 Br. at pp. 12-13 (the Ordinance gives the
Administrative Defendants authority to review "water rights, water source capacity, reserve
source capacity . . . outstanding commitment/board/service letters and other system
demands,55 etc.).
The relevant inquiry under CLUDMA, however, is not what or whom the
Ordinance might collaterally effect, but whether Summit County "considered] [the
Ordinance] necessary for the use and development of land within the county.55 Utah Code
Ann. § 17-27-102 ("counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they
consider necessary for the use and development of land within the county.55). Summit
Water wholly fails to address what the Summit County Commission "considered55 in
enacting the Ordinance and how those considerations related to land use and development
in the County.
In fact, as noted above, the Summit County Commission made specific legislative
findings reflecting its consideration that the availability of water through water companies
with a verified ability to deliver actual wet water was important to and intimately
connected with land use and development in the County. In pertinent part, those findings
were that: drought had caused water system failures affecting the ability to provide

adequate water service to existing connections or to permit new connections; water
shortages had been caused by poor water management decisions, and by well failures and
other causes reasonably beyond the control of management; water shortages could have
been lessened by interconnection of systems and a management vehicle to facilitate the
sharing of available surplus water resources; neither the Utah State Division of Drinking
Water ("DDW") nor the County had previously provided more than an initial feasibility
review of water companies's systems and appurtenances, and neither the State nor the
County were doing continuing periodic monitoring to ensure the various water companies
had an ongoing ability to meet service demands; new development should not occur unless
the water company supplying development could demonstrate the ability to provide water
to the development; and building permits should not issue for new construction unless the
physical water supply then currendy existed to serve the new connection, and an
irrevocable commitment for service was given by a water company to protect the property
owner's ability to obtain water service and to preserve the marketability of the property.
(R. at 27-29.)
And based on these findings, the structure of the Ordinance itself reflects the
County's consideration that the Ordinance was necessary for land use and development.
On its face, the ordinance is, inter alia: "An Ordinance Providing for the Establishment of
Zoning Regulations Regulating the Approval of Subdivision Plats and Building Permits in
the Snyderville Basin Planning District of Summit County53 (R. at 27.) To that end, and
as set forth above, Ordinance 436 requires that: (i) before a developer receives plat
approval or building permits from the County, the developer have a letter issued from a
water company within the county indicating the water company's willingness and
commitment to supply water (R. at 38-40); and (ii) water companies supplying

development within the County submit an annual Supply/Demand Study and five-year
forecast so that the County could assess the validity of the letters and the water companies3
actual ability to supply water pursuant to them. (R. at 42-48.)
Summit Water completely ignores these legislative findings or any analysis of the
structure of the Ordinance, and certainly provides no allegation or evidence to dispute
them. However, the Court is required to give deference and a presumption of validity to
these findings and the Ordinance they support. See, e.g., Gayland v. Salt Lake County,
358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961):
From the fact that [the county commissioners] hold such public offices it is to be
assumed that they have wide knowledge of the various conditions and activities in
the county bearing on the question of proper zoning, such as the location of
businesses, schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth in population and housing,
the capacity of utilities, the existing classification of surrounding property, and the
effect that the proposed reclassification may have on these things and upon the
general orderly development of the county. . . . In zoning, as in any legislative
action, the functioning authority has wide discretion. Its action is endowed with a
presumption of validity; and it is the court's duty to resolve all doubts in favor
thereof and not to interfere with the Commission's action unless it clearly appears
to be beyond its power; or is unconstitutional for some such reason as it deprives
one of property without due process of law, or capriciously and arbitrarily infringes
upon his rights therein, or is unjusdy discriminatory. The burden was upon the
plaintiff to show that the Commission's action was suffused with one or more of
those faults, which burden has not been sustained. . . . Under such circumstances
it was not the prerogative of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
Commission.
(Emphasis added.) See also Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah
1966) ("the court will not invade the province of the Commission and substitute its
judgment therefor; nor will it interfere with the prerogatives of the Commission unless it
is shown to be so clearly in error that there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it
and its action must therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary.");

Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah
1976) (exercise of zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by the legislative
bodies of municipalities; the wisdom of a zoning plan, its necessity and the nature and
boundaries of the zoned district are all matters within the legislative discretion; and
Supreme Court will avoid substituting its judgment for that of the zoning authority).
In light of the County's public policy goals and objectives as demonstrated in the
findings and provisions of the Ordinance, the district court correcdy found that Ordinance
436 is designed to insure there is water available for land use and development in the
County, and is thus authorized by CLUDMA. (R. at 235-36.) The Court need trouble
no further with Summit Water's unsupported, and essentially immaterial, characterization
that "[i]n essence, the Ordinance is water, not land use, regulation." Appellants' Br. at p.
13.
Summit Water goes on to argue that because the State Engineer and State
Department of Drinking Water are charged with regulating certain aspects of water rights
and use, the Court should not read CLUDMA to authorize Ordinance 436 "for the simple
reason that such regulation is already carried out and overseen by the State of Utah and is
not a function delegated to the counties." Appellants3 Br. at 17-18. Again, Summit
Water's argument is completely unsupported by CLUDMA or the ordinance at issue.
As it did in making its first argument, Summit Water ignores CLUDMA's enabling
language: "counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider
necessary for the use and development of land within the county.53 Utah Code Ann. § 1727-102. And again, Summit Water fails to see that the relevant inquiry is not what other
or additional regulation may also exist, but whether Summit County considered the
Ordinance necessary for land use and development in the County As set forth above, it is

undisputed that despite the existence of the "comprehensive" State water regulations which
Summit Water takes such pains to detail, the County's legislative body found, among
other things, that there was no mechanism in place at the state or county level to monitor
water companies' ability to provide actual wet water to development other than an initial
feasibility review, and based on those findings the County did consider the Ordinance
necessary for land use and development. (R. at 27-29.)
In light of the enabling legislation and specific legislative findings, there is
absolutely no basis to conclude that the mere existence of other state water regulations is
reason to read CLUDMA as not "authoriz[ing]" Ordinance 436. In fact, the County's
legislative body has found a need for Ordinance 436 with respect to water companies
suppling development, and acted to meet that need, and the existence of state regulation is
wholly immaterial to the County's authority under CLUDMA.
Summit Water finally reaches the language of CLUDMA itself, and goes on to
argue that "[n]othing under CLUDMA authorizes the type of comprehensive regulation of
water and water companies provided under Ordinance No. 436." Appellants' Br. at p. 18.
But again, Summit Water fails to analyze CLUDMA's enabling language in relation to the
considerations giving rise to the Ordinance.
Contrary to Summit Water's characterization that "CLUDMA is quite specific in its
grant of authority" (Appellants' Br. at p. 15), CLUDMA's grant of authority is actually
extremely broad. See, e.g., Adam Strachan, Concurrency Laws: Water as a Land Use
Regulation, 21 J. Land, Resources & Envtl. Law at 451-52 (noting that authority for
Summit County's concurrency ordinances comes from § 17-27-401, and stating that
"plaintiffs seeking to challenge Summit County's concurrency ordinance should look
beyond zoning or police power arguments . . . . " ) . Section 17-27-102 provides in

pertinent part that: "to provide for the health, safety and welfare, . . . counties may enact
all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and
development of land within the county . . . .55 Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-102.6
Thus, under CLUDMA's enabling language, it is necessary only that in order to
provide for the common welfare, the County considered Ordinance 436 necessary for land
use and development. As already discussed above, the County indisputably did so, and
Summit Water's analysis wholly fails to even address the public policy goals and objectives
related to land use and development specifically described in the legislative findings of the
County's legislative body. Summit Water has given neither this Court nor the court below
any basis to second guess the County on this issue, and the district court correctly
determined that Ordinance 436 is authorized by CLUDMA. Compare Cherokee Water &
Sanitation Dist. v. El Paso County. 770 P.2d 1339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (addressing a
four pronged attack on an ordinance requiring 300-year water supply for subdivision
approval, and concluding that cc[f]ar from being ultra vires, the amendment to the
regulations was adopted as an attempted implementation of the state statute pertaining to
subdivision regulations . . . [and] [t]he county acted well within its bounds in adopting
the regulation in question.53).
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In addition, § 17-27-104 provides that " . . . counties may enact ordinances
imposing stricter requirements or higher standards than are required by this chapter.55
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-104(1). And § 17-27-401 provides that cc[t]he legislative body
may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use and development that
furthers the intent of this chapter.55 Utah Code Ann. §17-27-401. Finally, § 17-27-302
provides that the County may adopt a general plan that "provide[s] for: . . . the efficient
and economical use, conservation, and production of the supply of: . . . food and water .
. . ,55 Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-302.

Finally contrary to Summit Water's misplaced reliance, Toone v. Weber County
2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079, neither addresses the issue nor implies Ordinance 436 is not
authorized by CLUDMA. In Toone, the Court simply noted that:
Plaintiffs do not challenge a land use decision made in the exercise of the provisions
of CLUDMA but instead assail Weber County's failure to follow certain procedural
requirements contained therein, which were triggered by its intent to sell land.
Toone. 2002 UT 103 11 10, 57 P3d 1079 (emphasis added). In the context of an alleged
failure to comply with procedural requirements prior to the sale of surplus property, the
Court observed:
Section 17-27-1001 does not apply . . . where a party seeks relief from a county's
violation of the provisions of CLUDMA because a county's failure to follow the
procedures mandated by CLUDMA is not a "land use decision" made under
CLUDMA.
I d at 11 8.
Toone is not applicable here because Summit Water does not allege the County
failed to follow procedures mandated by CLUDMA in adopting Ordinance 436 as
plaintiffs did in Toone. or even that MRSSD or the Administrative Defendants failed to
follow procedural steps outlined by Ordinance 436. Quite to the contrary, as the district
court correcdy noted, Summit Water's Complaint is a collateral attack on decisions actually
made under an ordinance passed pursuant to CLUDMA. Toone is simply inapposite.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED SUMMIT
WATER'S COMPLAINT SEEKING MANDAMUS RELIEF
BECAUSE SUMMIT WATER HAD OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY
AND ADEQUATE REMEDIES.
Summit Water's Complaint was brought pursuant to "Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
65B(a) & (d)" (R. at 3), which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary' relief on any
of the grounds set forth in paragraph . . . (d) (involving the wrongful use of
judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of
Pardons and Parole).

(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by
board of pardons and parole.

(d)(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entided; or (D) where the
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an
act required by constitutional or statutory law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a),(d).7
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Mandamus is a drastic remedy appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances.
Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist.. 954 P.2d 763, 768 (N.M. App. 1998). Mandamus
is available only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Utah R. Civ.
P. 65B (a person may petition for extraordinary relief "[w]here no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is available").

Assuming Ordinance 436 was enacted pursuant to CLUDMA, Summit Water
implicidy concedes it had other plain, speedy and adequate remedies besides mandamus.
Specifically, it had the peer review process provided by Ordinance 436 itself,8 and the
petition for review process provided by § 17-27-1001. The district court correctly
dismissed Summit Water's Complaint because by ignoring the remedies provided by the
Ordinance and § 17-27-1001, Summit Water placed itself beyond the reach of the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus. See, e.g., Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392
P.2d 40 (Utah 1964) (upholding dismissal of action to enjoin the issuance of a building
permit which allegedly violated county ordinances for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies or petition for review); Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning
Common, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983) ("By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law, the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus"); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't., 685 P.2d 550 (Utah
1984)(refusing to review mandamus challenge to denial of building permit).9
It is perhaps worth noting that: (a) Summit Water does not dispute the county
had authority for Ord. 436 under other provisions of state law (Appellants5 Br. at pp. 1819), and (b) there are administrative remedies in the ordinance itself, in the form of a peer
review process, separate and distinct from the petition for review process provided by
CLUDMA. Thus even assuming Summit Water were correct in asserting that CLUDMA
did not provide authority for the ordinance, which it is not, Summit Water still failed to
avail itself of the plain, speedy and adequate remedies provided by the ordinance, and
mandamus is inappropriate.
9

These holdings are consistent with the very nature of mandamus relief, which
serves to compel the performance of a nondiscretionary duty and to "compel action, when
refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way.33 State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969, 970 (Utah
1967) (emphasis added). Mandamus is intended "to compel a person to perform a legal
duty incumbent on him by virtue of his office or as required by law." Renn v. Utah State
Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995). As the Supreme Court noted in Wright

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellees respectfully requests this Court's Order
upholding die district court's dismissal of Summit Water's Complaint, no cause of action.
DATED this /fc*clav of August, 2004.
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Development v. City of Wellsville. 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980):
The action of the district court reflects a correct understanding and application of
the basic principles relating to the extraordinary writ oi mandamus: that its purpose
is not for the courts to intrude into or interfere with the functions or the policies of
other departments of government. Accordingly where the action sought is a
matter of discretion, the court may require the public body (or public official) to
act, but will not substitute its judgment for that of the public body by telling it
how it must decide; and when it has so acted the courts will not interfere therewith
unless the determination made is in violation of substantial rights, or is so totally
discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary.
608 P.2d at 233-34 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM
County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code Annotated §§ 17-27101, 17-27-102, 17-27-1001(2)(a):
17-27-101. Short tide.
This chapter shall be known as the "County Land Use Development
and Management Act."
17-27-102. Purpose.
(1) To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in Order to
provide for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and
aesthetics of the county and its present and future inhabitants and businesses,
to protect the tax base, secure economy in governmental expenditures, foster
the state's agricultural and other industries, protect both urban and non
urban development, and to protect property values, counties may enact all
ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use
and development of land within the county, including ordinances,
resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open spaces, structures,
buildings, energy-efficiency, light and air, air quality, transportation and
public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, public facilities,
vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those ordinances, resolutions,
or rules are expressly prohibited by law.
17-27-301. General plan.
(1) In order to accomplish the purposes set forth in this chapter,
each county shall prepare and adopt a comprehensive general plan for:
(a) the present and future needs of the county; and
(b) the growth and development of the land within the county
or any part of the county, including uses of land for urbanization,
trade, industry, residential, agricultural, wildlife habitat, and other
purposes.
(2) The plan may provide for:

(a) health, general welfare, safety energy conservation,
transportation, prosperity, civic activities, aesthetics, and recreational,
educational, and cultural opportunities;
(b) the reduction of the waste of physical, financial, or human
resources that result from either excessive congestion or excessive
scattering of population;
(c) the efficient and economical use, conservation, and
production of the supply of:
(i) food and water; and

17-27-401. General powers.
The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing
regulations for land use and development that furthers the intent of this
chapter.
17-27-1001. Appeals.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the
local decision is rendered.
(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law.
Rule 65B(a), (c) and (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the
grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal
liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority)
or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to
exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). There
shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the
procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary
relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings
on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth
elsewhere in these rules.

(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by
board of pardons and parole.
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court
for relief.
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an
act required by constitutional or statutory law.
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or
may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on
the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency, officer,
corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a
transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.

(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the
respondent has regularly pursued its authority
108803.1

